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Abstract
Chimpanzees confer benefits on group members, both in the wild and in captive populations. Experimental studies of how
animals allocate resources can provide useful insights about the motivations underlying prosocial behavior, and
understanding the relationship between task design and prosocial behavior provides an important foundation for future
research exploring these animals’ social preferences. A number of studies have been designed to assess chimpanzees’
preferences for outcomes that benefit others (prosocial preferences), but these studies vary greatly in both the results
obtained and the methods used, and in most cases employ procedures that reduce critical features of naturalistic social
interactions, such as partner choice. The focus of the current study is on understanding the link between experimental
methodology and prosocial behavior in captive chimpanzees, rather than on describing these animals’ social motivations
themselves. We introduce a task design that avoids isolating subjects and allows them to freely decide whether to
participate in the experiment. We explore key elements of the methods utilized in previous experiments in an effort to
evaluate two possibilities that have been offered to explain why different experimental designs produce different results: (a)
chimpanzees are less likely to deliver food to others when they obtain food for themselves, and (b) evidence of prosociality
may be obscured by more ‘‘complex’’ experimental apparatuses (e.g., those including more components or alternative
choices). Our results suggest that the complexity of laboratory tasks may generate observed variation in prosocial behavior
in laboratory experiments, and highlights the need for more naturalistic research designs while also providing one example
of such a paradigm.
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Introduction
The literature on social behavior in chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes) shows clearly that cooperation is common in these
animals. They cooperate when patrolling territorial boundaries
and attacking neighboring groups [1]; collaboratively hunting
small prey [2]; sharing meat and other foods [3–5]; exchanging
grooming for other valuable resources [6–8]; and jointly guarding
mates [9]. However, this rich record of cooperation drawn from
observational studies does not fully answer the question of how this
behavior is motivated. Animals’ social preferences lead them to
select outcomes based on how they impact the relative payoffs of
others, and different kinds of social preferences might be based on
distinct motivations and guide prosocial behavior in different ways.
For example, some prosocial behavior may be based on social
preferences that positively value the welfare of others (e.g.,
prosocial preferences or unconditional altruism) while others
may not (e.g., reciprocity, costly signaling). Studying naturalistic
interactions is necessary to understand chimpanzee social behav-
ior, but understanding the motivations behind this behavior and
the specific social preferences at work requires studies that control
parameters that are theoretically relevant to cooperative mecha-
nisms and the evolutionary processes that would favor them, such
as the relative benefits and costs that cooperative acts have for
individuals and other group members. Experiments with captive
animals offer opportunities to control these variables, and to
describe animals’ social motives.
Some experiments present captive chimpanzees with choices
that have different material payoffs for themselves and others, and
the choices animals make can reveal their underlying preferences.
One such study allowed animals to select between two different
payoff outcomes, both composed of fully visible food items [10].
One outcome (the ‘‘1/1’’ option) delivered a food reward to the
animal making the selection (the Actor) and an identical reward to
a familiar group member (the Recipient). The other outcome (‘‘1/
0’’) delivered one reward to the Actor, but nothing to the
Recipient. The selection between two payoff distributions like
these is often referred to as the Prosocial Choice (PC) task, and
Actors’ behavior (and/or lack of behavior) can be grouped into
three categories: (a) selecting the 1/1 outcome; (b) selecting the 1/
0 outcome; or (c) doing nothing. The key measure in this
experiment was whether subjects chose 1/1 more than 1/0. None
of the chimpanzees from two different captive facilities differen-
tiated between the Test trials (where a Recipient was present and
could obtain benefits) and the Non-Social Control trials (where no
Recipient was present), suggesting that the participant animals
were indifferent to the welfare of conspecifics. These results were
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replicated in the same populations using a slightly different
protocol [11], and in different populations [12,13], all with
procedures that used visible food rewards.
One exception to this pattern of results with the PC task is a
recent study in which Actors were presented with a bucket
containing many copies of two kinds of tokens, rather than an
apparatus that delivered food items [14]. One kind of token could
be traded with an experimenter to deliver a 1/1 outcome, while
the other kind could be traded to deliver a 1/0 outcome. No food
rewards were directly visible to Actors, as these rewards were
hidden in an opaque wrapping. Actors selected the 1/1 outcome
more frequently in the Test condition than in a Non-Social
Control condition, implying that animals were prosocial in this
study. The use of non-visible food rewards could be important, as
the visibility of food rewards has previously been shown to
substantially impact animals’ choices in experimental tasks [15].
Alternatively, the lack of an apparatus and a simultaneous
presentation of binary choices could be construed as reducing
the complexity of this task relative to prior PC tasks.
Other kinds of experimental designs have led to different
conclusions about chimpanzee prosocial behavior. In a body of
experiments called Instrumental Helping (IH) tasks Actors’
behavior (and/or lack of behavior) can be grouped into two
categories: (a) assist a conspecific or (b) do nothing. As these studies
lack a simultaneous presentation of binary choices, they could also
be construed as less complex than prior PC tasks. In IH studies
chimpanzees seem to be sensitive to outcomes obtained by others
because they provide help to Recipients in a variety of different
ways: unlocking a door that was obstructing access to food rewards
[16], releasing food rewards so they slide within reach of a
Recipient [17], pulling a handle to help a Recipient move a food
reward within reach [18], or transferring a tool to a partner who
needs it to obtain a food reward [19,20]. In these studies Actors do
not obtain food rewards for themselves when they provide help to
a conspecific, and it is possible that this explains why prosociality is
observed in IH tasks but not PC tasks [21]. Recent research
suggests that the mere presence of desirable food does not
influence subject animals’ willingness to provide help [17,22], but
Melis et al. [17] noted that animals may be less influenced by the
mere presence of food rewards than they are by obtaining food for
themselves at the same time as they deliver food to conspecifics.
However, there is also evidence that animals are no more prosocial
when they can deliver food to conspecifics after they have already
obtained food for themselves [11]. The results of IH studies have
been taken to reveal social preferences in chimpanzees that
positively value the payoffs obtained by others.
In a third body of experiments referred to as Inequity Aversion
(IA) studies, chimpanzees may refuse to participate in a task if they
receive a lower payoff for their participation than a conspecific
partner, and it has been argued that such behavior is evidence for
an aversion to inequity [23]. Inequity aversion might stabilize
cooperation by incentivizing individuals to reject inequitable offers
made by their partners in favor of other alternatives [24,25]. If
chimpanzees are averse to inequity then this points to preferences
that are sensitive to payoffs obtained by others. However, one
study was unable to replicate results using similar procedures [26],
and controversy remains both over how to interpret this
phenomenon [27] and the specific methods and contexts necessary
for eliciting an aversion to inequity in chimpanzees [28,29].
Results from a different paradigm suggest that captive chimpan-
zees use an apparatus to discard food items that they themselves
cannot access, but whether or not they discard this food isn’t
affected by whether or not another animal is feeding on that food
[30]. This suggests that these animals weren’t particularly
motivated to prevent other animals from obtaining more rewards
than themselves.
Differences in methodology, task demands, and the rewards
animals obtain across these bodies of research make it very difficult
to reconcile divergent findings about chimpanzee sociality. PC
tasks typically allow animals to obtain food rewards for themselves
while delivering food to others, while in IH tasks Actors do not
obtain food at the same time as do Recipients. The mere presence
of food does not inhibit subjects’ prosocial behavior [17], but it is
possible that seeing rewards that animals can obtain for themselves
obscures their prosocial tendencies. This might also explain why
one PC study using tokens and non-visible rewards found evidence
of prosociality [14] where other PC studies did not. A second
difference is that PC tasks present animals with a larger number of
discrete choices than do IH tasks. The complexity of the tasks (e.g.,
the number of outcomes to choose from, the number of locations
or events to keep track of, etc.) may affect the chimpanzees’
performance. This could be due to more complex tasks being too
cognitively demanding for participant animals, but it could also be
due to more complex laboratory tasks being less ecologically
relevant or less interesting to chimpanzees, rather than them being
too difficult to understand.
Here, we explore prosocial behavior in captive chimpanzees
using a procedure that manipulates payoff outcomes for Actors
and Recipients in ways similar to the PC, IH, and IA suites of
tasks. We investigate whether chimpanzees are less prosocial when
(a) tasks are more complex and (b) when animals obtain rewards
for themselves, two hypotheses that may explain differences in
observed levels of prosocial behavior across studies. No prior study
has used a common research design to explore and compare
findings from the PC, IH, and IA paradigms. Previous studies have
explored whether the mere presence of food rewards reduces
chimpanzee prosociality [17], but found no evidence that this
underlies the differences in results from different research
methods. We expand on this work by exploring whether animals
are less prosocial when they concurrently obtain food rewards for
themselves, in a manner that bridges prior work by Melis et al.
[17] and Jensen et al. [12]. Study 1 presents captive chimpanzees
with a prosocial task comparable to IH tasks, and tests whether
animals prefer outcomes that benefit others. We also test whether
animals are averse to prosocial outcomes that result in disadvan-
tageous inequity. Study 2 presents chimpanzees with a more-
complex prosocial task that is more analogous to previous PC
tasks. In both studies, we manipulate whether Actors obtain
payoffs for themselves at the same time that they deliver payoffs to
Recipients.
We also designed our tasks to be more naturalistic by testing
animals with unconstrained access to their social group, allowing
them substantial freedom of choice over when to participate in the
experimental trials and with which group members. Other studies
have taken a similar approach by also testing animals within their
home social groups [31–33]. There is substantial evidence that
partner choice is an important component of chimpanzee social
interactions, both in the wild [3,6–8,34,35] and in laboratory
experiments [36]. Allowing animals complete freedom of choice
over when to participate and with whom creates a more
naturalistic social interaction than typically allowed when animals
are isolated from their social groups. Such opportunities for
partner choice could be more likely to elicit prosocial behavior,
given prior evidence that animals engage in partner choice in
similar tasks [36], and designs such as the one introduced here can
be used in the future to study the role of reciprocity in chimpanzee
social behavior over longer time periods.
Task Design and Prosociality in Chimpanzees
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We highlight that our focus is primarily on prosocial behavior in
captive chimpanzees, rather than on describing these animals’
social preferences or prosocial motivations. Social preferences such
as reciprocity, prosocial preferences, or an aversion to inequity are
cognitive mechanisms that guide animals’ patterns of prosocial
behavior. Here we focus on describing the behavior itself, how it
can be elicited in relatively more naturalistic social interactions,
and how it varies across different kinds of task designs.
Understanding the relationship between task designs and prosocial
behavior will facilitate future research exploring the social
preferences behind chimpanzee prosociality, and also research
seeking to bridge the gap between studies of these animals in the
wild and in the laboratory.
Study 1
Subjects were socially housed chimpanzees at the Michale E.
Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine & Research (KCCMR)
in Bastrop, TX. Actor animals were able to deliver payoffs (pieces
of apple) to themselves and to other group members by using the
apparatus depicted in Figure 1. Whether payoffs could be
delivered to Actors, to Recipients, to both, or to neither was
varied across trials. This apparatus consisted of two plastic food
bins (the Actor bin and Recipient bin) that were anchored to the
enclosure more than a full arm span apart, a distance which
ensured that the Actor could obtain rewards directly from the
Actor bin, but not directly from the Recipient bin. Only one
animal at a time could act as Actor and operate the apparatus.
The apparatus was novel to all participants, but was similar to a
familiar enrichment device and its mechanics were thus familiar to
the participant animals. Trials were video recorded. All animals in
the group had free access to the apparatus, and individuals thus
varied substantially in the number of observations they contributed
to the dataset (ranging from 1 to 124 observations; median: 31; see
Table S1 for details, and demographic data on participants).
During testing the number of animals near the apparatus varied
and some animals participated more than others, with less-
dominant members of each social group not gaining as much
access to the apparatus as more-dominant group members.
However, dominant individuals did not exclusively monopolize
the apparatus (i.e., the Actor and Recipient roles weren’t always
filled by the same individuals), and animals with Medium
dominance had the most access (see Table S1). There were often
multiple possible Recipients on a given trial, as animals clustered
around the Recipient bin (see below for details about the
apparatus).
Payoffs for Actors and Recipients varied across trials (Table 1).
If Actors were prosocial they should have pulled more frequently
on trials where the Recipient obtained a reward (0/1) than on
trials where the Recipient obtained nothing (0/0), and also more
than on trials where the Recipient obtained nothing but a food
item was still visible (0/0(1); see Table 1). Recipients were able to
see whether or not food was placed in the Actor bin, and food
placed in the Recipient bin was always fully visible to the Actor.
For the 0/0(1) payoff distribution, the food item was placed on the
ground next to the Recipient bin, no more than 12 inches from
where the food was located when it was placed inside the
Recipient bin (as in the 0/1 payoff distribution). The food in the
0/0(1) condition was just as visible to the Actor as was the food in
the 0/1 condition. 0/1 most closely conforms to the payoff
outcome used in IH tasks, with only Recipients obtaining a benefit
at a very low cost to Actors (i.e., the energetic cost of pulling the
handle). Study 1 differs from prior IH studies in several
methodological respects, but it also shares important features with
IH studies where one animal was able to pull a handle to open a
door for a Recipient [16], or where one animal was able to remove
a pin to make food move within reach of a Recipient [17].
As long as Actors in the current study desired the food payoffs
then they would be expected to pull the handle at near-ceiling
levels when they themselves obtained rewards (1/0 and 1/1),
regardless of their social preferences. However, if chimpanzees
were averse to disadvantageous inequity then Actors would be
expected to pull the handle less when Recipients obtained a
greater payoff than they themselves did (1/3).
Results
The outcome variable was the binary parameter Actor Pulled
Handle, which captured whether the Actor pulled the handle
(coded as ‘‘1’’) or did not pull (coded as ‘‘0’’). Whether or not the
Actor pulled the handle was coded live, and a second coding
assessed the reliability of the live coding using 40 trials recorded
with video. The second coding agreed with the live coding on
every trial (Kappa = 1.00).
We included Actor identity as a random effect in our regression
models to control for non-independence of observations. Actor’s
Trial Number codes for the total number of test trials that Actors
had previously participated in (across all six payoff distributions).
Figure 2A illustrates that animals pulled the handle at different
rates across the six payoff distributions, and Actors pulled the
handle much more frequently when food was placed in the Actor
bin (1/3, 1/1, 1/0) relative to when no food was placed in the
Actor bin (0/1, 0/0, 0/0(1)). However, though the overall
likelihood of pulling the handle was low when there was no food
in the Actor bin, Actors were two to three times as likely to pull
when Recipients received rewards (0/1: mean number of trials/
SD = .15/.36, N = 72) relative to when Recipients did not receive
rewards (0/0: mean/SD = .05/.22, N = 78; and 0/0(1): mean/
SD = .07/.26, N = 83).
Recipients usually obtained available food when the Actor
pulled the handle on trials where food was placed in the
Recipient’s bin. Recipients failed to obtain all food available to
them on only two trials (2% of total) for the 0/1 payoff
distribution, and four trials (5% of total) for the 1/1 payoff
distribution. For the 1/3 payoff distribution Recipients failed to
Figure 1. Apparatus used in Study 1. (A): The apparatus in the No
Access position, with bins at rest where animals could not obtain any
food. (B): The apparatus in the Access position, with bins pivoted
upward so that food rewards were in reach of animals inside the
enclosure. Pulling the handle moved the apparatus from No Access (A)
to Access (B). While pulling the handle, the Actor could acquire food
placed in the Actor bin, but could not reach food in the Recipient bin. If
the Actor released the handle both bins returned immediately to the No
Access position and any food remaining in the Recipient bin rolled back
out of reach.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103422.g001
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obtain all of the food rewards on 21 of the trials (30%), but no
instances of aggression by Recipients toward Actors were
observed.
Multilevel (generalized mixed effects) logistic regression analyses
were performed in STATA 11 (using the xtlogit function). Our
regression model (see Table S2) uses 0/0 as a reference point and
asks whether Actors pull the handle more or less frequently for the
five other payoff distributions than they do for 0/0. The coefficient
for 0/0(1) is positive but smaller than its standard error
(coefficient/SE = .34/.67), suggesting that animals were not
substantially more likely to pull the handle when a food item
was present but inaccessible. The coefficient for 0/1 is positive and
about twice as large as its standard error (coef./SE = 1.22/.61),
indicating that Actors were more likely to pull the handle when a
food item was present and placed inside the Recipient bin. The
coefficient for 0/1 (Table S2) translates to an Odds Ratio of 3.38
(SE: 2.07), indicating that animals were 3.38 times more likely to
pull the handle for 0/1 (15% of trials) than they were for 0/0 (5%
of trials). See Table S3 for an analysis showing how this result is
robust to dropping individual participant animals from the sample.
The coefficients were all positive and much larger than their
standard errors for 1/0 (coef./SE = 5.96/.77) and 1/1 (coef./
SE = 7.42/1.16), and Actors pulled the handle on every 1/3 trial.
This indicates that Actors were very likely to pull when they would
receive food. The random effect parameter reflects the variation in
the outcome measure across individuals. Its coefficient is small,
and also smaller than its SE, suggesting that subjects were largely
similar in their behavior (coef./SE = .30/.41; see Table S2). Actor’s
Trial Number predicted animals’ behavior to different degrees
across trial types (Figure 2B, see Table S4 for models). For 1/1, 1/
0, 1/3, and 0/1, the Actor’s likelihood of pulling the handle
changed little as trial number increased. For 0/0 and 0/0(1)—the
two trial types in which neither Actor nor Recipient ever obtained
payoffs—the predicted probability of pulling for 0/0 and 0/0(1)
drops substantially as a function of experience with more trials (see
Figure 2B, and Table S4).
In the Knowledge Probe we explored whether Actors were
more likely to pull the handle when the apparatus was modified to
allow them to directly access food from the Recipient bin (four
animals were willing to be isolated for this test; see Methods
section at the end for details). The purpose of the Knowledge
Probe was to confirm that animals’ more frequent pulling of the 0/
1 outcome (relative to the 0/0 outcome) was due to an
understanding that doing so allowed access to food placed in the
Recipient bin. We found that in the Knowledge Probe animals
were indeed much more likely to pull the handle for 0/1 than they
had been in the Test trials (OR = 44.6, see Table S5 for regression
model; see Figure 3 for means, standard deviations, and sample
sizes), and for most of the animals they showed this pattern from
the very beginning of the Knowledge Probe (see Figure S1, Table
S6 and Table S7). For 1/1, animals pulled the handle on every
trial in both the Knowledge Probe and Test trials, and for 0/0
Actor animals pulled the handle at comparably low rates in both
the Knowledge Probe and Test trials (see Figure S2).
Table 1. Payoff distributions used in Study 1.
Payoff distributions Payoff for Actor Payoff for Recipient
0/0 Zero Zero
0/1 Zero One reward
1/0 One reward Zero
1/1 One reward One reward
1/3 One reward Three rewards
0/0 (1) Zero Zero (one food item placed on the ground next to the Recipient’s bin)
We label these distributions using the convention of ‘‘(Actor’s payoff)/(Recipient’s payoff).’’
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103422.t001
Figure 2. Data from Study 1. (1A) Proportions of all trials during which actors pulled the handle to operate the apparatus, for each of payoff
distribution. Error bars reflect one SE of the mean but do not control for non-independence, though models suggest there is little between-subjects
behavioral variation (see Table S2). Numbers of subjects and observations are listed on the right. (1B) Logistic functions modeling the effect of Actor’s
Trial Number on the probability that Actors will pull the handle (see Table S4 for regression model estimates). These probabilities are comparable to
the proportions from Figure 1A. Y-axis represents the probability that actors will pull the handle. X-axis represents the number of trials that an Actor
has received previously (across all payoff distributions). Error bars around the red line (modeling the probability of pulling the handle for 0/1 trials) are
estimated 95% confidence intervals, and control for non-independence.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103422.g002
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Discussion
Actors were far more likely to pull the handle on trials in which
food was in the Actor bin. On those trials in which no food was
placed in the Actor bin, Actors were also relatively more likely to
pull the handle on trials in which food was placed in the Recipient
bin. Animals demonstrated their comprehension of the task by
showing different responses to the different trial types. With
experience, Actors remained consistent in their tendency to pull
the handle when Recipients obtained a benefit (0/1), while
simultaneously becoming less likely to pull the handle when
neither Actor nor Recipient benefitted (0/0 and 0/0(1)). As all
three of these conditions have the same direct payoff for the Actor,
animals would only show this pattern is if they were attending to
the rewards in the Recipient bin, and if they understood that
pulling the handle made rewards available in the 0/1 condition
(but not the other two conditions). This pattern thus shows that
Actors understood that pulling the handle made food in the
Recipient bin available. Given that only Recipients could directly
access food in the Recipient bin, the pattern of results suggests that
Actors comprehended how their choices impacted group mem-
bers, and also that they learned to ignore trials that didn’t deliver
benefits to conspecifics or to themselves. Additionally, Actors were
more willing to pull the handle in the Knowledge Probe than in
the Test trials, but only when food was placed only in the
Recipient bin (0/1). This again shows that they understood that
pulling the handle caused food in the Recipient bin to become
available. These results are independent, as each could be true
while the others could have been false, and each is consistent with
the fact that animals understood the critical feature of the device:
pulling the handle made food in the Recipient’s bin available.
One possibility is that Actors pulled the handle because they
wished to make food accessible to the interior of the enclosure, but
not specifically because they wished for Recipients to obtain it.
This is possible, particularly because there was always a non-zero
probability that the Actor would receive food once it was retrieved
by a Recipient. However, given that only Recipients could directly
access the food in the Recipient’s bin (and Actors were relatively
far away), the likelihood was always that the food would be
consumed before the Actor got to it. Thus, the overall pattern of
results strongly points to Actors understanding that pulling the
handle was likely to deliver food that only another group member
would consume. Overall, Study 1 suggests that captive chimpan-
zee Actors display behavior that confers low rates of prosocial
outcomes on Recipients within a task similar to the one used in IH
tasks. Again, the motives behind animals’ behavior is not obvious,
but nonetheless Actor’s in Study 1 did show a small tendency to
act in a way that was more likely to confer benefits on others than
it was on themselves.
In Study 2 we explore whether chimpanzees also behave
prosocially when we modify the same apparatus to create a
situation that more closely resembles the PC task [10,13,37]. We
also explore whether chimpanzees will be more prosocial in the
PC task if they do not obtain food for themselves concurrently with
delivering food to conspecifics, as proposed by Melis et al. [17].
Jensen et al. [12] previously tested this hypothesis and found no
support for it, but using a different method than Melis et al. [17].
Here we extend these findings by exploring whether we can obtain
more evidence of prosociality in chimpanzees than did Jensen
et al. [12] by using our apparatus from Study 1, which (like the
apparatus used by Melis et al. [17]) elicits non-zero rates of helping
behavior.
Study 2
Participants were drawn from three social groups at KCCMR,
each containing 4–7 animals. None of these groups were included
in Study 1, and all participants were naı¨ve to the apparatus in
Study 2. Once again, trials were video recorded. During trials,
Actors were faced with a choice between two of the same 2-bin
mechanisms used in Study 1, arranged side by side (see Figure 4).
When an Actor pulled the handle that operated one of the
mechanisms the device automatically retracted the other mecha-
nism’s handle (i.e., the experimenter did not retract the handle).
This prevented Actors from operating more than one mechanism
within a single trial, and if both handles were pulled then neither
apparatus delivered payoffs until one handle was released and fully
retracted. All animals in the social group again had free access to
the apparatus, and there was again substantial variation in the
number of observations that the Actors contributed to the dataset
(ranging from 23 to 332 observations; median: 141; see Table S8
for details, and demographic data on participants). Dominant
individuals again likely had greater access to the apparatus, but did
not monopolize it.
Payoffs for Actors and Recipients (pieces of banana) again
varied across trials (Table 2). If subjects preferred 1/1 over 1/0
(the 1/1 v. 1/0 condition), but not 1/1 over 1/0(1) (the 1/1 v. 1/
0(1) condition), this would suggest that they were simply biased by
Figure 3. Data from Knowledge Probe (Study 1). Proportions of trials during which Actors pulled the handle to operate the apparatus during
the Test trials (dark grey bars) and during the Knowledge Probe (light grey bars), for the 0/1 payoff distribution only. Each pair of bars corresponds to
one of the Actors who participated in the Knowledge Probe. Values below the x-axis provide means, standard deviations, and sample sizes. Error bars
reflect 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103422.g003
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the greater quantity of food associated with 1/1. The 0/1 v. 0/0
condition was equivalent to the 1/1 v. 1/0 condition except Actors
obtained no food rewards for themselves regardless of which
option they selected. The 1/1 v. 0/1 condition evaluated animals’
attentiveness to the task by providing them with choices that only
varied in the payoffs they conferred on Actors themselves. If
animals pulled each handle only half the time in the 1/1 v. 0/1
condition, this would indicate that they did not understand or were
not attending to the apparatus, and were merely selecting handles
at random.
Results
The primary outcome variable was the binary parameter Actor
Chose Prosocial Outcome. For the 1/1 v. 1/0, 1/1 v. 1/0(1), and 0/1
v. 0/0 conditions, prosocial choices (1/1, 1/1, and 0/1,
repectively) were coded as ‘‘1’’, and non-prosocial choices (1/0,
1/0(1), and 0/0) were coded as ‘‘0’’. For the 1/1 v. 0/1 condition,
1/1 was coded as ‘‘1’’ and choices of 0/1 as ‘‘0’’. Our primary
analyses exclude trials in which Actors selected neither of the
payoff distributions, and we separately analyze trials wherein
Actors make no choice (i.e., ‘‘do nothing’’). Multi-level logistic
regressions (generalized mixed effects models, STATA 11 function
‘‘xtlogit’’) controlled for non-independence of observations by
considering Actor identity as a random effect, and we investigated
how Actor’s Trial Number predicted animals’ behavior in each of
the four conditions.
Animals behaved differently across the conditions. When we
examine all trials together, the mean rate at which Actors selected
the prosocial outcome was .36 (SE = .03) for the 0/1 v. 0/0
condition, .54 (SE = .03) for the 1/1 v. 1/0 condition, .50 (SE = .03)
for the 1/1 v. 1/0(1) condition, and .98 (SE = .01) for the 1/1 v.
0/1 condition. This includes trials during which animals selected
one of the two handles, and also trials during which Actors did
nothing (i.e., chose neither handle). Actors selected the prosocial
outcome nearly 50% of the time for the 1/1 v. 1/0 and 1/1 v.
1/0(1) conditions, but below 50% of the time for the 0/1 v. 0/0
condition, and well above 50% of the time for the 1/1 v. 0/1
condition. Overall rates of 0/1 choices (i.e., prosocial choices) in
the 0/1 v. 0/0 condition of Study 2 (mean = .36) are thus higher
than were rates of 0/1 choices in Study 1 (mean = .15). However,
rates of 0/0 choices were also higher in the 0/1 v. 0/0 condition of
Study 2 (mean = .27) than they were in Study 1 (mean = .05), and
Actors also frequently chose nether of the outcomes during trials
(mean = .38). This pattern suggests that animals were not strongly
biased towards the prosocial outcome in the 0/1 v. 0/0 condition
(i.e., 0/1). However, it does appear to be true that Actors were
more willing to ‘‘do nothing’’ in Study 1 than in Study 2, at least
when they obtained no rewards for themselves.
Actors’ rates of ‘‘doing nothing’’ were much higher in the 0/1 v.
0/0 condition (mean/SE = .38/.03) than in the 1/1 v. 1/0
condition (.01/.005), 1/1 v. 1/0(1) condition (.003/.003), and
1/1 v. 0/1 condition (.01/.005). When we focus only on trials in
which Actors chose one of the two handles, animals only displayed
a systematic bias in their selection of one mechanism over the
other in the 1/1 v. 0/1 condition, when their own rewards were the
only payoffs at stake (Figure 5A). For trials in which only the
Recipient’s payoffs were at stake, Actors chose the prosocial
outcome slightly more than 50% of the time for the conditions 1/1
v. 1/0 (mean/SE = .57/.04) and 0/1 v. 0/0 (.54/.03), but exactly
50% of the time for the 1/1 v. 1/0(1) condition (.50/.03). In the
1/1 v. 0/1 condition animals chose the outcome that delivered a
reward to themselves on nearly every trial (mean/SE = .99/.01).
Across conditions, the estimated probability that Actors chose the
prosocial outcome was very stable as trial number increased, and
the random effect parameter was small, suggesting that there was
little behavioral variation across subjects (Figure 5B, see Table S9
for regression models). However, increasing trial number did lead
to a greater probability that Actors would do nothing (i.e. pull
neither of the handles) in the 0/1 v. 0/0 condition (Figure 5B, red
dotted line), but not in any of the other conditions (see Table S10
for regression models). These results suggest that in the 0/1 v. 0/0
condition animals were more likely to pull neither handle than
they were in the other conditions, and that this pattern increased
as the experiment progressed.
Discussion
Our prior results from Study 1 suggest that chimpanzees from
this population understood how to use these apparatuses to make
food accessible to Recipients, and the results from Study 2 suggest
that chimpanzees understood the how to use these apparatuses to
systematically deliver food to themselves (in the 1/1 v. 0/1
Figure 4. Apparatus used in Study 2. (A): The apparatus in the No
Access position, before the Actor has pulled either of the two handles.
(B): The apparatus in the Access position, after the right handle has
been pulled by the Actor, which retracts the left handle so that it
becomes inaccessible (i.e., it is now impossible for the Actor to move
the left Actor bin and left Recipient bin into the Access position). (1a):
left Actor bin. (2a): right Actor bin. (1b): left Recipient bin. (2b): right
Recipient bin. (1c): left handle. (2c): right handle.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103422.g004
Table 2. Payoffs distributions used in Study 2.
Payoff Distribution Description
1/1 v. 1/0 Prosocial outcome vs. Non-Prosocial outcome. Rewards for actor.
1/1 v. 1/0 (1) Prosocial outcome vs. Non-Prosocial outcome. Rewards for actor. (one food item placed on the ground next to the Recipient’s bin for the 1/0
payoff.)
0/1 v. 0/0 Prosocial outcome vs. Non-Prosocial outcome. No rewards for actor.
1/1 v. 0/1 Payoff for self vs. No payoff for self.
We label these distributions using the convention of ‘‘(Actor’s payoff)/(Recipient’s payoff).’’
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103422.t002
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condition). Overall, animals were very slightly more likely to select
the prosocial outcome over the non-prosocial outcome in both the
1/1 v. 1/0 and 0/1 v. 0/0 conditions, and rates of selecting the
prosocial outcome did not differ across these two conditions,
indicating that Actors were not more prosocial when they did not
obtain rewards for themselves. However, Actors were not more
likely to select the prosocial outcome over the non-prosocial
outcome in the 1/1 v. 1/0(1) condition. This implies that in the 1/
1 v. 1/0 and 0/1 v. 0/0 conditions animals were not biased toward
the prosocial outcome per se, but they were biased toward the
location containing greater quantities of food, a phenomenon that
has been reported previously in chimpanzees [10,15,38]. Given
Actors’ systematic behavior in the 1/1 v. 0/1 condition, these
results suggest that animals were not merely inattentive to the
apparatus, nor were they simply selecting handles at random.
Instead, these results are consistent with animals being indifferent
to the payoffs obtained by Recipients in Study 2.
General Discussion
We observed that captive chimpanzees acted to confer benefits
on conspecifics in some laboratory contexts (though at low rates),
and our findings suggest that methodological differences may help
explain discontinuities in results across studies. In this way these
data are consistent with studies of wild animals, and with the
results of laboratory studies showing prosocial behavior in IH
studies [16–19] and one PC study [14]. However, it is crucial that
empirical studies distinguish how their results pertain to prosocial
behavior and to prosocial motivations. Data from these kinds of
laboratory studies (and also naturalistic interactions) cannot reveal
the nature of chimpanzees’ social preferences. This is because
these data describe animals’ behavior but do not disambiguate
various possible preferences or social motivations, of which there
are several possibilities in the current studies. Animals might act
prosocial for motives that do not positively weight others’ welfare
(e.g., trying to elicit reciprocity or to avoid conflict, signaling one’s
intrinsic quality as a mate), and so studying whether chimpanzees
confer prosocial outcomes says more about behavior than
motivations. This problem has been highlighted recently by Heyes
[39], who points out that prior evidence for prosocial behavior
[14] could be a product of conditioning—not a psychology
motivated to deliver benefits to conspecifics. Chimpanzees may be
adaptively prosocial even if they lack psychological mechanisms
that value the welfare of others independently of their own welfare.
This may be true in the current study as well as all previous studies
in the literature. However, we emphasize that the psychological
motives underlying prosocial behavior in chimpanzees can only be
studied after first developing methods that consistently elicit it.
These methods will be critical not just for integrating studies of
chimpanzee sociality from the wild and the laboratory, but also for
making phylogenetic comparisons between studies of prosociality
in chimpanzees and those in other ape species [40], and also
cercopithecines [41,42] and platyrrhines [43,44].
Although chimpanzees acted prosocially in Study 1 the rates of
animals’ prosocial choices were quite modest, which starkly
contrasts with the prosocial acts frequently observed in laboratory
interactions between humans [45–48]. It is thus important to
consider the different motives that could have generated the
results. In Study 1 Actors were only 10% more likely to pull the
handle on 0/1 trials (15%) than 0/0 trials (5%), implying that
Actors were weakly influenced by the payoffs obtained by
Recipients in this task. Harassment or begging by Recipients
could motivate this kind of behavior [5], though there were no
observed instances begging or aggression directed by Recipients
towards Actors. Alternatively, this behavior could be motivated by
reciprocity given that our subject animals were permitted
unconstrained partner choice in non-anonymous interactions with
long-term social partners. There is evidence for reciprocity in
captive chimpanzees [49], but analyses of reciprocity in the
current paradigm would require additional data, as free partner
choice resulted in particular pairs of Actors and Recipients being
disproportionately represented in the dataset, reducing the
necessary variation in Actor/Recipient pairings. Evidence from
studies of wild chimpanzees suggest that there may be more
evidence for long-term reciprocal exchanges [50,51] than for
short-term exchanges [51,52], and future work on reciprocity in
captive populations should also explore reciprocity over the long-
term [53].
Figure 5. Data from Study 2. (3A) Proportion of trials during which actors selected the prosocial outcome (for 1/1 v. 1/0, 1/1 v. 1/0(1), and 0/1 v. 0/0
conditions) or the self-maximizing outcome (for 1/1 v. 0/1), on trials where the Actor selected one of the two options. If Actors were indifferent to the
payoffs obtained by recipients, they would be expected to pull the handle on half of the trials (proportion of .50). Numbers of subjects and
observations are listed on the right. (3B) Logistic regressions representing the probability of actors’ choices as a function of Actor’s Trial Number (see
Table S9 for regression model estimates). Solid lines depict the estimated probabilities that actors will select the prosocial or self-maximizing
outcome, which are comparable to the proportions from Figure 3A. Y-axis represents the probability that actors will select the prosocial or self-
maximizing outcome, and the x-axis represents the number of trials that an actor has received previously (across all payoff distributions/conditions).
The red dotted line depicts the estimated probability that actors will do nothing (i.e., pull neither of the handles) in the 0/1 v. 0/0 condition (see Table
S10 for regression model estimates).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103422.g005
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Our results are not consistent with the hypothesis that
chimpanzees are less prosocial when they obtain rewards for
themselves [17,22], because in Study 2 Actors were equally
indifferent to the payoffs obtained by others in both the 0/1 v. 0/0
and the 1/1 v. 1/0 conditions. This replicates similar findings by
Jensen et al. [12] showing that animals were not more prosocial in
a condition where they did not obtain rewards for themselves, but
we do so using an experimental apparatus that did elicit low levels
of prosocial behavior in Study 1. Our findings revealing evidence
for prosociality in Study 1 but not in Study 2 suggest that more
complicated experimental tasks involving choices between more
possible outcomes (such as the one used in Study 2) may be less
likely to elicit prosocial behavior in captive chimpanzees relative to
simpler tasks involving choices between fewer possible outcomes
(such as the one used in Study 1). In Study 1, animals showed a
weak tendency to deliver prosocial outcomes when presented with
a single apparatus that they could either use or not use (similar to
IH tasks), but animals showed no evidence of prosociality in Study
2 where they had to select between two simultaneously presented
apparatuses (similar to PC tasks).
Also in Study 1, greater experience with the task led Actors to
be less willing to pull the handle and operate the apparatus for the
0/0 and 0/0(1) payoff distributions, but not for 0/1. Actors thus
learned to reduce their pulling when neither they nor a Recipient
obtained a reward, but not when a payoff could be obtained from
the Recipient bin (likely by a Recipient). This would predict that
greater experience with the 0/1 v. 0/0 condition from Study 2
should lead Actors to reduce their choices of 0/0 but not 0/1. The
likelihood of selecting the prosocial outcome in the 0/1 v. 0/0
condition should have increased as the study progressed, but this
did not happen. If anything, with greater experience Actors simply
became more likely to do nothing.
Subject animals in Study 1 showed in a number of ways that
they understood how to use the apparatus so as to enable access to
food in the Recipient bin, and the causal affordances of the
apparatuses in Study 2 were identical to those of the apparatus
used in Study 1. Thus, it is unlikely that the reduction in
prosociality in Study 2 was due to an inability to understand that
pulling the handle for this kind of apparatus would make food
available to the Recipient, and it was more likely due to the
introduction of an additional apparatus (i.e., a second payoff
choice). There are many reasons why this could have influenced
Actors’ behavior. The addition of a second apparatus may have
distracted the animals in Study 2 and prevented them from
attending to the Recipient’s payoff. Alternatively, evaluating the
merits of one payoff outcome (choice) in Study 1 may be much
more straightforward and less noisy a process than evaluating two
choices and comparing them simultaneously, as animals may have
had to do in Study 2. Regardless, these results imply that a
particular kind of task complexity (i.e., number of discrete choices)
may be particularly problematic for laboratory studies of
prosociality in captive animals. Our results suggest that the
difference in the results obtained across PC and IH tasks isn’t due
to differences in the causal complexity of the individual
components of the experimental tasks (e.g., the causal affordances
of the apparatuses). Instead, differences in results may be due
rather to differences in the number of alternative choices the two
kinds of tasks present to subject animals.
Note that we do not use task complexity to mean task difficulty,
and we do not know whether differences in prosocial behavior
across tasks of different complexity is due to differences in how
cognitively demanding subject animals found these tasks to be. It is
possible that more complex tasks are indeed more cognitively
demanding than are simpler tasks, perhaps because they require
attention to and tracking of more objects and locations, but it is
also possible that more complex tasks are simple less ecologically
relevant or less interesting to animals. Furthermore, while our
results are consistent with the hypothesis that more-complex tasks
are more cognitively demanding than are less-complex tasks (in
addition to other hypotheses described above), they do not suggest
that all tasks involving two choices will fail to elicit prosocial
behavior in captive chimpanzees. Instead, our results predict that
within any given kind of apparatus or task paradigm, tasks with
relatively more choices or components might be less effective at
eliciting prosocial behavior.
These results are interesting to consider in light of recent
findings showing that chimpanzees displayed a systematic bias
towards selecting prosocial outcomes in a variant of the PC task in
which Actors obtain food when delivering food to Recipients [14],
a result that appears to contradict those of the 1/1 v. 1/0 condition
that we used in Study 2 and also the results of prior studies using
the PC task [10–13,37]. In this study, subject chimpanzees were
provided with a bucket containing two kinds of tokens, and
subjects could transfer one kind of token to the experimenter to
confer a 1/1 outcome (i.e., to provide food to a Recipient) and the
other kind of token to confer a 1/0 outcome. It is possible that the
structure of this task allows subjects to consider tokens serially
rather than simultaneously, and thus allowed animals to evaluate
individual tokens (i.e., individual payoff outcomes/choices) in
isolation, similar to how animals in Study 1 evaluated individual
payoff outcomes in isolation. It is possible that if two tokens were
presented in parallel to animals by an experimenter in a more
binary-choice situation (as in Study 2), animals would show a
reduced tendency to select the 1/1 token. This could potentially
account for other findings where chimpanzees display prosocial
behavior in situations where they can evaluate one possible choice
at a time out of a set of provided choices, such as a result where
Yamamoto and colleagues provided subject chimpanzees with a
set of possible tools and observed that subjects tended to pass the
correct tool to a Recipient who needed it to access a food reward
[20]. This would be a good test of the hypothesis that the number
of discrete simultaneous choices with which animals are presented
influences the likelihood of observing prosocial behavior.
It is also possible that the use of tokens themselves might also be
crucial for understanding differences in observations of prosocial
behavior across published studies, and differences in the use of this
methodology could underlie controversial inconsistencies in how
chimpanzees’ behave in recent studies of the Ultimatum Game
[54,55]. Future research should explicitly test whether the use of
tokens impacts prosocial behavior, in the same way that we have
here tested other methodological hypotheses. One final possibility
is that differences between captive populations tested may play a
role [56]. There is evidence for variation in cooperative behavior
across populations of wild chimpanzees, with, for example,
hunting by chimpanzees in the Taı¨ forest being collaborative
and marked by exchange of meat for mating opportunities [2,50],
while hunting in Kibale National Park was less consistent with
collaboration or meat-for-mating exchanges [57]. However,
differences in cooperation across captive populations is not well
understood.
Our results are also inconsistent with studies finding inequity
aversion in captive chimpanzees [23]. If Actors in the current
study had been averse to disadvantageous inequity, we would have
expected them to pull the handle less for 1/3 trials than for 1/1
trials, a pattern similar to one reported when capuchin monkeys
(Cebus apella) were presented with a forced-choice between 1/1
and 1/3 [58]. However, our chimpanzee Actors appeared
insensitive to the difference between these payoff distributions,
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even though animals showed that they understood the apparatus
used in Study 1. It has been argued that it is necessary for subject
animals to be engaged in an experimental task for a response to
inequity to be elicited [23], and consistent with this Actors in our
studies are engaged in a task. However, the structure of our task is
distinctly different from the standard task that elicits inequity
aversion, in that our task involves no token exchange and the
subject animal directly creates the inequitable outcome by
delivering the rewards to themselves and a conspecific [23] (rather
than indirectly creating the inequity through an experimenter, as
in many IA studies). It is possible that the use of tokens and the role
of the experimenter is required for the phenomenon to hold, but it
remains a tantalizing theoretical question why laboratory elicita-
tion of inequity aversion in chimpanzees might be constrained to
these particular task designs [28,29].
These results suggest that a task using a single apparatus may be
better at eliciting patterns of prosocial behavior in captive
chimpanzees than would be a task using two copies of the same
apparatus, and in this way the present studies suggest that
asymmetries in evidence for prosocial behavior across different
experimental tasks may be due to asymmetries in task complexity
(defined as the number of components or choices included in a
task design). Precisely why more complex tasks may inhibit
prosocial behavior in these animals cannot be determined from the
present study, and many other differences in methodology might
also influence chimpanzee prosociality in laboratory tasks (e.g., the
value or kind of food rewards, the use of tokens). Future work
should explore these issues. However, a larger matter still looms:
despite the plausible need for cooperation in both captive and wild
chimpanzee social groups, evidence for chimpanzee prosociality in
the laboratory is still weak relative to evidence from the wild. A
primary benefit of laboratory studies is that they permit the
investigation of mechanisms and motivations underlying chim-
panzees’ naturally-occurring prosocial behavior, but to do this
requires experimental tasks that capture prosocial behavior in such
a way that costs and benefits can be manipulated in a controlled
manner. The methods used here describe one way to approach
this problem, while also employing a task that more closely
emulates the freedom for partner choice that exists in the wild.
Making experiments progressively more naturalistic should be a
goal of laboratory work, and it will allow more powerful
generalization of laboratory results to the behavior of wild
chimpanzees.
Methods
This study protocol was approved by the Animal Research
Committee of the University of California, Los Angeles (ARC
approval permit #2011-036-01). Animals were drawn from a
captive population of 175 chimpanzees housed at the KCCMR in
Bastrop, Texas. Animals were not food-deprived, and had ad
libitum access to food and water throughout the study. Supple-
mentary fruits and vegetables were provided to animals once daily.
Animals were housed in social group enclosures with both exterior
and interior areas, and all animals participated in a behavioral
management program to ensure their mental health and well-
being. This program includes daily environmental enrichment
procedures in which animals are provisioned in both indoor and
outdoor areas with enrichment devices for resting and climbing
(e.g., grass ground cover, multi-level wooden platforms, ham-
mocks, hanging tires, brachiation bars, utility poles, ropes and
cargo nets, barrels, and large culverts), along with additional
foraging apparatuses (e.g., kong toys filled with food) which were
changed regularly. The study did not interfere with animals’
normal activities except when they were isolated during the
Knowledge Probe in Study 1. The Knowledge Probe was only
begun when animals did not show stress at being isolated, it lasted
about 30 minutes, and it was halted if animals began to show any
signs of distress. Animals were isolated in the exterior areas of their
home enclosure, and had unconstrained access to light, food,
water, and enrichment. No animals were harmed.
Study 1
Participants. Many participants had previously taken part in
cognitive experiments, and some in prior experiments on prosocial
behavior [10,37]. Animals were housed in one all-female or one
all-male social group of 6 or 7 animals whose membership had
been stable for several years, and had access to food and water
throughout the day. Groups were entirely composed of adults.
Apparatus. Actor animals were able to deliver payoffs to
themselves and/or other group members by using an apparatus
consisting of two plastic food bins that were anchored to the
enclosure. When a handle was pulled by the Actor both bins
pivoted upwards, allowing animals inside the enclosure to obtain
food placed in the bins, but the distance between the bins
prevented one animal from pulling the handle and obtaining
rewards from both bins (see Figure 1). Only one handle was
provided, and when the handle was released both bins returned to
their original position and rewards were not accessible, ensuring
that the Actor could obtain rewards from only the Actor bin (and
not the Recipient bin).
Task comprehension. During pilot testing animals were
willing to pull the handle and able to retrieve rewards from the
Actor bin (i.e., animals were not scared of the apparatus), so
instead of using a formal training procedure we evaluated whether
animals’ behavior changed as a function of experience (i.e. trial
number). These results indicate that Actors understood that the
food in both the Actor bin and the Recipient bin was obtainable,
and that they conditioned their behavior on the presence of this
food (see Study 1 Results). To further assay animals’ understand-
ing of the task, at the conclusion of Study 1 we also conducted a
Knowledge Probe where we explored whether Actors were more
likely to pull the handle when the apparatus was modified to allow
them to directly access food from the Recipient bin (see below).
Testing procedure. Testing consisted of sequential blocks of
six randomized trials, with each trial corresponding to a different
payoff distribution. This counterbalanced the payoff distributions
by presenting each distribution once every 6 trials (on average).
Each trial type appeared no more than twice in succession, and did
not predict the next trial type. The number of blocks presented
each day varied based on each group’s availability for testing.
Trials were run whenever a potential Actor was present, and
animals were coaxed to participate by verbal calls and displaying
the available food rewards.
A trial did not start unless (1) 30 seconds had passed from the
start of the previous trial, (2) a potential Actor was near the testing
area, (3) the apparatus was at rest in the No Access position (see
Figure 1), and (4) any payoffs remaining from the previous trial
had been removed. A trial lasted no less than 30 seconds, and
ended if the animal did not pull within that period or pulled before
all payoffs were placed. The experimenter called the Actor’s
attention and waited until Actors looked in his direction as he held
up the payoff and then placed it by hand into the appropriate bin
(if the trial called for zero payoffs the experimenter only touched
the bin).
Knowledge Probe. At the conclusion of Study 1 we modified
the apparatus with a longer handle to allow Actors to pull the
handle and climb down to obtain food from the Recipient bin. We
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then isolated animals and presented them with trials using the 0/1,
1/1, and 0/0 payoff distributions using this modified apparatus. If
Actors understood that pulling the handle caused food in the
Recipient bin to become accessible, they should be more likely to
pull the handle in the Knowledge Probe than in the Test trials for
the 0/1 payoff distribution, but not for the 1/1 and 0/0 payoff
distributions. We conducted the Knowledge Probe at the end of
Study 1 to avoid training animals that they could directly obtain
food for themselves by pulling the handle during 0/1 trials, which
could appear as prosocial behavior if the Testing trials followed the
Knowledge Probe. Four of the subject animals (two male, two
female) were willing to be isolated for the Knowledge Probe.
Study 2
Participants. One of the participating social groups included
animals ranging from one juvenile to adults, while the other two
social groups included mostly older adults. All groups were mixed-
sex. The composition of two groups from which participants were
drawn had been stable for several years, while the third group was
newly formed (this group contributed only one participant). These
groups were entirely different from the groups participating in
Study 1.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Study 1,
but a familiarization procedure was employed because the
apparatus was larger and had more parts, and we wanted to
ensure that animals were not afraid of it. Prior to testing, subjects
received 40 counterbalanced trials from the 1/1 v. 0/1 condition.
Testing consisted of blocks of eights trials, each containing four sets
of two trials. Each of the fours sets of two trials used one of the four
basic payoff distributions, but counterbalanced the side of
presentation of specific payoff outcomes (e.g. one trial would load
1/0 on the left and 1/1 on the right, and the second would load 1/
1 on the left and 1/0 on the right). Within each block, the order of
these 8 trials was randomized. No trial appeared more than twice
in succession, and no trial type predicted the subsequent trial type.
At the start of a trial the experimenter drew the Actor’s
attention verbally, and waited until the animal looked in his
direction as he held up each reward and loaded it by hand first
into the Recipient bins, followed by the Actor bins (see Figure 4).
The Test Phase began when the experimenter inserted the handles
into the enclosure, making them accessible to the Actor (see
Figure 4).
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Study 1, Knowledge Probe. Plot of regression
models (Table S4) of the effect of Actor’s Trial Number on actors’
willingness to pull the handle. Each plot models the behavior of
one individual. Solid lines reflect the estimated probability that an
individual will pull the handle when presented with a 0/1 payoff
distribution, as a function of how many 0/1 trials they have
received. Dashed lines reflect the estimated probability that an
individual will pull the handle when presented with a 0/0 payoff
distribution, as a function of how many 0/0 trials they have
received. Shaded areas reflect 95% confidence intervals. See Table
S6 and Table S7 for model coefficients and variance estimates. For
subjects 201, 303, and 302 the estimates suggest that animals were
more likely to pull the handle on the first 0/1 trial (solid line) than
on the first 0/0 trial (dashed line). This suggests that the animals
were able to figure out from the beginning of the Knowledge
Probe that they would now be able to obtain food on 0/1 trials.
For Subject 202, the estimates are somewhat counterintuitive for
the first few trials, with a rather high likelihood of pulling the
handle on 0/0 trials but a low likelihood on 0/1 trials, but by trial
#6 the pattern displayed by the other subjects emerges and
remains consistent. This suggests that Subject 202 was somehow
confused at the start of the Knowledge Probe, and it took a few
trials to figure out that food was now accessible on 0/1 trials but
not on 0/0 trials. However, the overall pattern is one of animals
quite quickly adapting their behavior to fit the modified apparatus
in the Knowledge Probe, and maximizing their food payoffs by
pulling the handle on 0/1 trials.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Study 1, Knowledge Probe. Analysis of 0/0 trials.
Animals were presented with three different payoff distributions in
the Knowledge Probe: 0/1, 1/1, and 0/0. If Actor animals
understood that pulling the handle made food in the Recipient bin
accessible, they should be more willing to pull the handle in the
Knowledge Probe than the Test trials when food is placed only in
the Recipient bin (i.e., the 0/1 payoff distribution). This is because
pulling the handle allows them to obtain food for themselves in the
Knowledge Probe, but not in the Test trials. However, for the 1/1
payoff distribution animals should be near-ceiling in their
willingness to pull the handle both in the Test and Knowledge
Probe, because in both sets of trials they obtain food for themselves.
Similarly, in the 0/0 payoff distribution animals should be near-
floor in their willingness to pull the handle in both the Test and
Knowledge Probe, because in both sets of trials they cannot obtain
food for themselves. Results showed that these four subject animals
were indeed more likely to pull the handle for the 0/1 payoff
distribution in the Knowledge Probe than in the Test trials (see
Figure 3 in main text). Additionally, animals pulled the handle for
the 1/1 payoff distribution on every trial in both the Knowledge
Probe and Test trials. Actor animals also pulled the handle at very
low rates for the 0/0 payoff distribution in both the Knowledge
Probe and Test trials, and at comparable rates across both sets of
trials (see accompanying Figure S2). It is true that subject 202 did
pull the handle more frequently on 0/0 Knowledge trials than 0/0
Test trials, but moving from the Test trials to the Knowledge Probe
has a much greater impact on subject 202’s rates of pulling the
handle for the 0/1 payoff distribution (main text Figure 2) than the
0/0 payoff distribution (Figure S2).
(TIF)
Table S1 Study 1, Total number of observations
contributed by each subject in Study 1, along with
demographic data on subjects. Total N/Average N per
animal, for Low dominance: 92/30.7. Total N/Average N per
animal, for Medium dominance: 542/136.8. Total N/Average N
per animal, for High dominance: 122/40.7.
(DOCX)
Table S2 Study 1, Multi-level logistic regression models
replicating the results displayed in Figure 2A, control-
ling for subject identity (i.e., non-independence in the
data). Animals pulled the handle on every 1/3 trial.
(DOCX)
Table S3 Study 1, Robustness analysis. Table provides the
coefficients for the parameter 0/1 in Table S3 above (which
models how animals’ behavior changes when switching from a 0/0
trial to a 0/1 trial), when dropping out each of the animals in the
sample one at a time. One of the animals contributed no data to
this condition (206), but for most of the other animals excluding
their data does not change the valence of the coefficient, nor does
it dramatically change the magnitude of the coefficient (which
remains larger than it’s standard error). This means that even
though there is substantial variation in the amount of data each
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animal contributes to the sample, the pattern is not likely to be
entirely driven by any one animal.
(DOCX)
Table S4 Study 1, Models of the effect of Actor’s Trial
Number on actors’ willingness to pull the handle and
operate the apparatus in Study 1, represented in
Figure 2B.
(DOCX)
Table S5 Study 1, Knowledge Probe. Multilevel logistic
regression for Knowledge Probe. Effect of moving from the Test
trials into the Knowledge Probe on Actor’s frequency of pulling
the handle. The models below ask how the binary variable Trial
was in Knowledge Probe predicts the probability that animals
pulled the handle. For the 0/0 payoff, animals were not more
likely to pull the handle if the trial was in the Knowledge Probe, as
the coefficient for the parameter is smaller than its standard error.
However, for the 0/1 payoff, animals were much more likely to
pull the handle if the trial was in the Knowledge Probe, as the
coefficient for the parameter is much larger than its standard error.
This corresponds to an Odds Ratio of 44.6, meaning that Actors
were 44 times more likely to pull the handle in the Knowledge
Probe than in the Test trials. The coefficient for the Random
Effect parameter is also somewhat larger than its standard error,
suggesting that there may be some variation in this pattern across
individuals.
(DOCX)
Table S6 Study 1, Knowledge Probe. Regression model for
Figure S1. This model predicts the Actor’s probability of pulling
the handle as a function of three predictors: Payoff_is_0/1, codes
whether the payoff on a given trial was 0/1 or 0/0 (with 0/1 coded
as ‘2’ and 0/0 coded as ‘1’). Payoff_trialnum, codes the trial
number of each trail within a particular payoff distribution (i.e.,
whether this is the first 0/1 trial, the second, etc.). Payoff_trialnum
X Payoff_is_0/1, an interaction term for the other two parameters.
This is the most interpretable and interesting term in the model,
and indicates how the difference in pulling across the 0/1 and 0/0
payoffs changes as a function of trial number (i.e., experience in
the task). The model also allows these parameters to vary across
the four individuals tested in the Knowledge Probe. However, with
only four individuals the model has difficulty estimating the
variance of these predictors across clusters (individuals), and the
raw coefficients and standard deviations are difficult to interpret.
In particular, the interaction term is positive but has a large
variance. Table S7 provides a similar model that does not allow
these parameters to vary across individuals, making the raw
estimates for coefficients and variance more interpretable. These
regressions were performed in the R statistical computing
environment using Stan, a Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler,
and glmer2stan a convenience package for generating generalized
linear mixed model code for Stan.
(DOCX)
Table S7 Study 1, Knowledge Probe. Regression model for
Figure S1, excluding varying estimates for each Actor. Similar
model as in Table S6, but without allowing the parameters to vary
across individuals. The interaction term is the most informative
here, and the coefficient for this predictor is greater than zero.
This was not obvious from the prior model in Table S5, because
the parameter was allowed to vary across a small number of
individuals (only four).
(DOCX)
Table S8 Study 2, Total number of observations
contributed by each subject in Study 2, along with
demographic data on subjects. Total N/Average N per
animal, for Low dominance: 680/136. Total N/Average N per
animal, for Medium dominance: 244/244. Total N/Average N
per animal, for High dominance: 281/140.5.
(DOCX)
Table S9 Study 2, Regression models of the effect of
Actor’s Trial Number on actors’ likelihood of choosing
the prosocial option in Study 2, represented in Fig-
ure 5B.
(DOCX)
Table S10 Study 2, Regression models of the effect of
Actor’s Trial Number on actors’ likelihood of choosing
neither handle in the 0/1 v. 0/0 condition of Study 2,
represented in Figure 5B.
(DOCX)
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